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R. F. Langley: Seeing Things 
 
Though R. F. Langley was committed—in his own words—to the ‘observation 
of fact’, his poetry and prose journals more often stage a variety of 
epistemological dilemma. More particularly, Langley’s writing frequently 
discovers a torque between (in Bertrand Russell’s terms) knowledge by 
‘acquaintance’ and knowledge by ‘description’. This essay approaches Langley’s 
negotiation of these positions via his response to earlier modernisms, especially 
those of Ezra Pound, Charles Olson and the art critic Adrian Stokes. Langley’s 
work, it is suggested, furthered and refined a modernist concern with perception 
and knowledge even as later modernist poetics departed from questions of 
epistemology towards those of semiotics and linguistics. 
 
 
In an essay first published in 1911, Bertrand Russell made an influential distinction between two 
varieties of knowledge. On the one hand, says Russell, we can speak of knowledge by 
‘acquaintance’, which involves a ‘direct cognitive relation’ to an object.1 On the other hand, there 
is knowledge by ‘description’, in which the thing known assumes the form of ‘“a so-and-so”’ or 
‘“the so-and-so”’.2 Knowledge by acquaintance is direct and unmediated; knowledge by 
description is mediated and propositional. While knowledge by acquaintance includes knowledge 
of sense-data, knowledge by description includes everything beyond our immediate experience, 
including knowledge of physical things and other people’s minds.3 
R. F. Langley was probably not familiar with this epistemological distinction at first hand, 
but the discrepancy it implies between mediated and immediate knowledge was reflected in his 
own practice, particularly in its extended negotiation with earlier modernist poetry. Late 
modernism, in Langley’s oeuvre, attends to problems in epistemology and aesthetics which had 
come to the fore of modernist poetics and art writing, particularly in the work of his major 
forebears, Ezra Pound and Adrian Stokes. A feature of his broader philosophical and theoretical 
concerns (which included, prominently, object-relations psychoanalytic theory), the distinction 
                                                            
1 Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 11 (1910-11), 108-28 (p. 108). 




between direct and mediated knowledge represents a major part of Langley’s sustained 
conversation with English poetics generally and American modernism in particular.  
Langley began his reading in modernism in the late 1950s, a moment when English 
poetry, under the sway of the Movement, had become defiantly risk-averse.4 Reaching Jesus 
College, Cambridge on a scholarship in 1957, he became close to J. H. Prynne and studied the 
American modernists (particularly Pound) with Donald Davie, in addition to Stokes’s art 
criticism.5 The publication of Donald Allen’s anthology, The New American Poetry 1945-1960 
(1960), introduced Langley to more recent American poetry in the modernist line, particularly the 
Black Mountain and New York schools. In a ‘questionnaire’ completed for Matías Serra 
Bradford, he included—in addition to Wordsworth and Hopkins—‘Oppen, Williams, O’Hara, 
Olson, a whole set of Americans of that time, maybe’, as early touchstones.6 These poets 
represented the rigorously objective line in modernist anti-symbolism, deriving from the ‘direct 
treatment’ of Imagism.7 In their agile perceptiveness and outwardness, Williams’s Spring and All 
(1923) and Oppen’s Discrete Series (1934)—and even, perhaps, O’Hara’s Lunch Poems (1964)—
must have seemed more legitimate extensions out of Wordsworth and Hopkins than the English 
‘Movement’. This early fusion of English and American poetics, the lyric tradition and modernist 
free verse, would continue to inform Langley’s work as it committed itself to ‘getting in close to 
observation of fact’.8 Be it an oak carving in a Suffolk church, the Mildenhall Great Dish or a 
                                                            
4 See, among others, Andrew Duncan, The Failure of Conservatism in Modern British Poetry 
(Cambridge: Salt, 2003).  
5 Peter Riley, ‘RF Langley obituary’, The Guardian (7 March 2011) <https://www.theguardian. 
com/books/2011/mar/07/rf-langley-obituary> [accessed 24 February 2016]. See also Jeremy 
Noel-Tod, ‘Introduction’, in R. F. Langley, Complete Poems, ed. by Jeremy Noel-Tod (Manchester: 
Carcanet, 2015), p. ix. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text as 
CP. 
6 Matías Serra Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry: A Quiz for R.F. Langley’, PN Review 37.5 
(May/June 2011), 151-7 (p. 16). 
7 Ezra Pound, ‘A Retrospect’, in Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, ed. by T. S. Eliot (New York: New 
Directions, 1968), p. 3. 
8 Quoted in Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry’, p. 16. 
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moth or butterfly, Langley’s poems give themselves to exacting registrations (in Olson’s words) 
of the ‘objects of reality’.9 
But Langley’s fidelity to the ‘facts’ of the external world is rarely straightforward, and 
more frequently stages versions of an epistemological dilemma. More concretely, the poems (as 
well as the partly published Journals) are often subject to an acute ambivalence about the 
epistemological value and function of indirect or propositional knowledge; a philosophical 
problem that also bears strongly on more locally poetic questions of diction, syntax, rhythm and 
structure. On the one hand, Langley’s empiricism is often informed by—and structured 
around—knowledge and theory derived from fields including natural history (particularly 
entomology and ornithology) and art history. On the other hand, his oeuvre registers the 
obfuscation presented by knowledge by description, sometimes appealing to a version of the 
philosophical tabula rasa; what is called, in several poems, ‘emptiness’ or ‘nothing’ (CP 14, 154). 
Ironically, perhaps, this position is itself indebted to literary precedents, as well as parallel lines of 
reasoning in the work of, for instance, John Cage and the British psychoanalyst Marion Milner.10  
This torque between propositional knowledge and direct perception had been familiar 
enough to early and high modernism. Beginning with Impressionism, as Sara Danius has 
discussed, modernism’s eyes often aspired to the mechanical innocence of the camera or the X-
ray.11 Pound, for instance, infamously claimed that the Chinese character is intelligible to anyone 
with a natural sense of ‘pictorial values’.12  Likewise, Pound’s friend Stokes structured his criticism 
around a conception of art as visually and intellectually self-evident, ‘something instant and 
                                                            
9 Charles Olson, ‘Projective Verse’, in Collected Prose, ed. by Donald Allen and Benjamin 
Friedlander (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 243. 
10 Each mentioned by Langley in Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry’, p. 16. 
11 Sara Danius, The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), p. 55. 
12 Ernest Fenollosa and Ezra Pound, The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry: A Critical 
Edition, ed. by Haun Saussy, Jonathan Stalling and Lucas Klein (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), p. 59. 
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revealed’.13 Perhaps even more pertinent to Langley—who read and taught Shakespeare 
throughout his life—is Louis Zukofsky’s principal ‘theme’ in the five-hundred page Bottom: On 
Shakespeare (1963): ‘that Shakespeare’s text throughout favors the clear physical eye against the 
erring brain’ [emphasis mine].14 However, claims for optical innocence and immediacy were as 
much a rhetorical ploy—militating against ‘habits of artistic perception’—as strategies achieved 
in fact.15 Pound’s own perception was rarely so naïve, being invariably informed by myth, text, 
and memory. Similarly, while Stokes regarded the artwork as immanent and self-revealed, this did 
not prevent his own criticism bringing to bear a formidable command of art history. Meanwhile, 
Zukofsky’s Bottom is itself a brilliant testament to the discursive, wayward pleasures of an ‘erring’ 
intellect. 
This basic structural ambivalence about the value of knowledge by description as a 
supplement to knowledge by acquaintance is re-evaluated throughout Langley’s small poetic 
oeuvre; a task which placed him at some distance from other developments in late modernist 
poetics (which have been concerned, on the whole, less with epistemological than with semiotic 
and linguistic problems). In this, Langley was—as he himself recognised—‘out on a limb’.16 
However, this tangentiality might also provoke an expanded critical conception of literary late 
modernism. Langley’s concern with what it is to ‘know’ and ‘see’—informed by mid-century art 
criticism and psychoanalysis, as well as American modernist poetry—further evidences the 
interpretability and variousness of modernism’s legacies for contemporary English poetry.  
 
 
                                                            
13 Adrian Stokes, The Quattro Cento and The Stones of Rimini (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 15. 
14 Louis Zukofsky, Prepositions: The Collected Critical Essays of Louis Zukofsky (London: Rapp and 
Carroll, 1967), p. 159. 
15 Danius, The Senses of Modernism, p. 55. 
16 R. F. Langley and R. F. Walker, ‘R. F. Langley Interviewed by R. F. Walker’, in Don’t Start Me 
Talking: Interviews with Contemporary Poets, ed. by Tim Allen and Andrew Duncan (Cambridge: Salt, 




Towards the end of her journal A Life of One’s Own (1934), one of a number of books Langley 
mentioned as having ‘read often’, the British psychoanalyst Marion Milner recorded a decision to 
abandon psychoanalytic theory, temporarily, for a more direct observation of the self and its 
experience of the world.17 In lieu of psychoanalytic ‘science’, Milner proposed to herself a form 
of ‘blind thinking’ which might redeem the world’s quiddity from the secondary ‘system of 
charts’ provided by psychoanalysis: 
  
Science was perhaps a system of charts for finding the way, but no amount of 
chart-studying would give to inlandsmen the smell of a wind from the sea. 
So, at one time, with the usual ‘all-or-noneness’ of blind thinking, I had been 
inclined to repudiate the chart altogether because it was not also the sea.18 
 
The hard lesson Milner claims to have learned—‘that I must never begin my search by looking in 
books’—may suggest, as Rachel Bowlby has said, ‘a little disingenuousness’.19 After all, the lesson 
is being offered to readers. However, ‘blind thinking’ has a distinguished modern provenance, 
being found at least as early as Descartes’s Discourse on Method. Descartes too had ‘abandoned the 
study of letters’, ‘resolving to seek no knowledge other than that which could be found in myself 
or else in the great book of the world’.20 The Book of Nature was later privileged—with ironic 
consequences—by Romantic poetry, including in Wordsworth’s ‘The Tables Turned’ (1798), 
where the reader is implored (with thirty-one lines to go) to ‘quit your books’ for the world 
outside.21   
                                                            
17 Quoted in Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry’, p. 16. 
18 Marion Milner, A Life of One’s Own (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 158-9. Rachel Bowlby 
quotes the passage in her ‘Introduction’ to this edition, p. xxv. 
19 Milner, A Life of One’s Own, p. 12. Bowlby, ‘Introduction’, p. xxv. 
20 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Vol. 1, 
p. 115. 
21 William Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads, and Other Poems, 1797–1800, ed. by James Butler and 
Karen Green (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 109. 
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 Langley also stages this paradox, but with the addition of a further equivocation; for to 
‘repudiate the chart’ and switch to ‘blind thinking’ is not—for all Descartes’s and Milner’s 
confidence—a matter of the will. This seems to be the sticking point of ‘The Upshot’. Not least 
in its bookishness—allusions to Proust, Olson and William Carlos Williams meet with 
etymological play—‘The Upshot’ acknowledges impediments to Zukofsky’s ‘physical eye’ 
presented by prior knowledge. Though Langley later revealed the scene of the poem to be St 
Andrew’s Church in Westhall, Suffolk, this information is studiously withheld from the reader.22 
The result is an interpretive punctum caecum which bears directly upon the speaker’s own difficulty 
in seeing, knowing, and ‘achieving’: 
 
 We leave unachieved in the 
 summer dusk. There was no 
 need for you rather than me. 
 Here is the unalterable truth. 
 Outside the open door peculiar 
 bugbears adopt the dark, then Kate 
 passes across. Next to nothing 
 depends on her coming in.   (CP 12) 
 
Proust, as Langley himself noted, provides the first sentence.23 Yet the English adjective 
‘unachieved’ is also telling. According to Skeat’s etymological dictionary (which Langley found 
indispensable), ‘achieve’ derives from the French phrase venir a chief; ‘to come to the end or arrive 
at one’s object’.24 The difficulty of ‘arriving at one’s object’—when ‘object’ is understood, 
literally, as a ‘thing’—will be the matter of the following stanzas. Even here, however, the 
ambiguous inversion of Williams’s declaration in ‘The Red Wheelbarrow’ (‘so much depends’ 
                                                            
22 Langley and Walker, ‘R. F. Langley Interviewed by R. F. Walker’, p. 249. 
23 Ibid. 
24 W. W. Skeat, A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1911), p. 5. 
7 
 
becomes ‘Next to nothing | depends’) anticipates the problem of arriving at or achieving the 
ordinary things of the world.25 
 Yet Langley’s objects are less mundane than Williams’s, at least in this poem. The second 
stanza introduces them as ‘eight absurd captains’ (CP 12); objects which the poet later glossed as 
the carved wooden ‘poppy heads’ adorning the church pews.26 Again, however, the reader is not 
privy to this knowledge, and is therefore placed in a predicament equivalent to that of the 
speaker. These heads are ‘here’ independently of the viewer, ‘whether they are seen or not’, and 
this separation between subject and object appears unassailable. In the fifth stanza, the speaker 
even considers that, ‘There’s a chance Kate saw | more by not coming in’ (CP 13). That line 
might imply movement toward a rationalist position, empirical experience having been found 
wanting. But the penultimate stanza identifies the unknowableness of the eight poppy heads in a 
surplus, rather than a shortfall, of knowledge: 
 
 They stand up but don’t go. All ready, 
 not started. Full stretch in their rigid 
 heads. Now, when I need it, I’m so close 
 to emptiness. But I know too much about 
 each of those eight fixed faces. Unless 
 you ask about the eyes. You do. Here’s 
 the opening for the hundred tricks Kate 
 took by walking across, not looking in.  (CP 14) 
 
If ‘emptiness’ is a condition of understanding, what ‘I know’ will present an insuperable obstacle. 
This disruptive knowledge could be that of untrustworthy sense perception (the heads seen 
within a play of light and shadow, for instance). More likely, however, it is the kind of knowledge 
by description brought to the encounter itself; the information an inquiring reader might derive 
                                                            
25 William Carlos Williams, Selected Poems, ed. by Charles Tomlinson (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 
57. It is possible that Langley’s ‘bugbears’ allude to Adrian Stokes in The Thread of Ariadne (1925). 
In the third chapter of this, his first, book, Stokes comments: ‘Our bears are no longer in the 
wood, but rather in ourselves—the bugbear of introspection for instance’. Stokes, The Thread of 
Ariadne (London: Kegan Paul, 1925), p. 14. 
26 See Langley and Walker, ‘R. F. Langley Interviewed by R. F. Walker’, p. 249. 
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from works such as J. Charles Cox’s English Church Fittings, Furniture and Accessories (1923), which 
clarifies that the term poppy head ‘has no connection with the flowering plant of that name, but 
is derived from the French “poupee”—a puppet or figurehead’.27 Might such propositional 
knowledge compromise the carving’s sensuous immediacy? Perhaps, like Henri Gaudier-Brzeska 
faced with Chinese characters, genuine understanding of exterior objects requires the naiveté of 
blind thinking?  
 In his major early work, The Quattro Cento—particularly important to Langley—Adrian 
Stokes did not quite propose ignorance as the ground of aesthetic experience.28 But, like Pound, 
Stokes insisted upon the instantaneousness of aesthetic perception and finds in the true ‘Quattro 
Cento’ style an appeal only to the physical eye. The fifteenth-century ‘compulsion’ to ‘throw life 
outwards, to make expression definite on the stone’, involved, says Stokes, a ‘mass-effect in 
which every temporal or flux element was transformed into a spatial steadiness’.29 This ‘mass-
effect’ was self-revelatory: ‘Stone is the greatest instrument of mass-effect, of instant revelation: 
non-rhythmic, for the flux of life has passed into objective forms’ (emphasis mine).30 For Stokes, 
‘Quattro Cento’ sculpture—Verocchio’s lavabo in the Basilica of San Lorenzo in Florence, for 
instance—is ‘something instant and revealed’; a form of intellectual and emotional immediacy 
that is already self-complete.31 ‘What I call purely visual matter,’ he says later in the study, ‘is 
dissociated from noise as well as from silence, from past, present and future. Things stand 
expressed, exposed, unaltered in the light, in space. Things stand.’32 ‘Quattro Cento’ work 
abolishes time in the creation of an art which can be understood by the ‘synthesis that the eye 
alone of the senses can perform’.33 There is no equivocation about such art, and no recourse to 
                                                            
27 J. Charles Cox, English Church Fittings, Furniture and Accessories (London: B. T. Batsford, 1923), p. 
109. 
28 See Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry’, p. 16. 
29 Stokes, The Quattro Cento, p. 15. 
30 Ibid. 
31 The six-page description of Verrocchio’s lavabo is Stokes’s pièce de résistance. Ibid, pp. 59–65. 
32 Ibid., p. 158. 
33 Ibid., p. 156. 
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books; it strikes the viewer with an immediacy that is anterior to thought. Quite simply, in 
‘Quattro Cento’ sculpture, ‘Things stand’. 
 This is not the experience of Langley’s speaker in ‘The Upshot’, however, who recognises 
that such instantaneous revelation will require a particular state of mind on the part of the viewer 
(and, indeed, the reader). As David Herd notes, the ‘emptiness’ introduced by Langley as the 
condition of this state might recall Olson in ‘Projective Verse’ (1950), particularly the injunction 
towards a ‘humilitas’ that will provide the ‘secrets objects share’.34 But the trope is a pervasive 
one, finding further variations in Milner’s ‘blind thinking’ and Wallace Stevens’s ‘nothing 
himself’.35 In his Notes on Cinematography, which Langley also records as reading frequently, Robert 
Bresson discussed shooting scenes in a similar way: ‘Put oneself into a state of intense ignorance 
and curiosity, and yet see things in advance’.36 Though Jeremy Noel-Tod and Herd agree that the 
idea is a version of Keats’s ‘negative capability’, it also recalls Stevens’s source in the famous 
passage in Emerson’s ‘Nature’ (1836): ‘I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all’.37  
Even so, it is the irony of ‘The Upshot’ that however clearly the speaker recognises the 
value of emptiness or ‘intense ignorance’, the ‘transparent eye-ball’ or ‘blind thinking’ is not 
something that can be adopted at will or by choice. ‘I know too much’ suggests this, while the 
final stanza confirms that the speaker will leave without ‘achieving’ the carved faces on the pews. 
 
 We leave unachieved in the 
 summer dusk. There are no 
maps of moonlight. Things 
stand further off. We find 
                                                            
34 Quoted in David Herd, ‘Emptying, Holding, Settling: The Poetry of R. F. Langley’, Edinburgh 
Review <https://edinburgh-review.com/extracts/article-david-herd/> [accessed 28 February 
2016]. 
35 Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems, 2nd edn. (New York: Vintage, 2015), p. 11. 
36 Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry’, p. 16. Robert Bresson, Notes on Cinematography, trans. 
by Jonathan Griffin (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 8. 
37 Jeremy Noel-Tod, ‘Jeremy Noel-Tod remembers R. F. Langley, with Langley’s “Sixpence a 
Day”’, Cambridge Literary Review II/5 (Summer 2011), 71-8 (p. 71). Herd, ‘Emptying, Holding, 
Settling’, n.p. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays and Lectures, ed. by Joel Porte (New York: Library of 
America, 1983), p. 10. 
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peace in the room and don’t 
ask what won’t be answered. 
We don’t know what we see, so 
there is more here. More. Here.   (CP 14) 
 
That adage, ‘We don’t know what we see’, would not be out of place in Thoreau’s journals (‘I 
begin to see such an object when I cease to understand it’, Thoreau says of Fair Haven Pond’38).  
However, this superlative form of seeing is frustrated in the church, precisely because the 
speaker knows ‘too much’. Perhaps recalling Wittgenstein’s conclusion to Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (‘what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence’), the speaker finds ‘peace 
in the room’ and will not ‘ask what won’t be answered’.39 That there is ‘More. Here’ might be a 
pledge to the immediate, but its stubbornness also registers epistemological frustration. There 
might be ‘more here’ but whatever that is remains inaccessible to a subject who already knows 
(like Kant’s subject) ‘too much’ to grasp it instantaneously. Whereas for Stokes ‘Things stand’, 
for Langley ‘Things | stand further off’.  
 
‘OPERATING ON VARIABLES’ 
‘The Upshot’ would appear to weigh heavily against knowledge by description, privileging optical 
innocence (however inaccessible) over second order experience (‘we don’t know what we see’). 
Even so, the language of the poem militates against too strict an interpretation of that position, 
forming an echo chamber in which the very fact of ‘unachieving’ situates the poem in a literary 
culture capacious enough to include Wordsworth, Proust, Emerson, Olson and Wittgenstein. 
This is the irony that would attend any reasoned or textual argument for blind seeing or any call 
for ‘emptiness’ in the excessive medium of literary discourse. It is also the irony that would see 
                                                            
38 Henry David Thoreau, A Writer’s Journal, ed. by Laurence Stapleton (New York: Dover, 1960), 
p. 23. 
39 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness 
(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 89. And, at 6.51: ‘Doubt can exist only where a question exists, a 
question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said’, p. 88. 
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Stokes extend one famous evocation of ‘Quattro Cento’ immediacy over the course of six 
elaborately descriptive pages.40 
 A poem published in the chapbook Hem (1978), ‘Matthew Glover’, registers this irony by 
mapping the epistemological distinction between acquaintance and description against another 
disputed boundary, that between prose and poetry. Langley described this poem, deprecatingly, 
as ‘a fairly naive attempt to do a miniscule Olson in an English setting’, and like Olson’s early 
‘Maximus’ poems the poem draws strongly on assembled fact.41 Moreover, like the ‘Maximus’ 
poems, ‘Matthew Glover’ suggests a torsion between informational prose and lyric instancy, a 
distinction we might also be inclined to map against Zukofsky’s ‘erring brain’ and ‘physical eye’. 
However, the poem’s ostensible separation of these two modes is far from stable, and this 
insecurity comes to bear on the difficulty of detaching ‘empty’ lyric experience or ‘blind thinking’ 
from supporting factual knowledge (in this case, the social history of the English Midlands). To 
put this another way, ‘Matthew Glover’ will not quite accept its own provisional distinction 
between lyric perception and prose exposition. 
The poem opens with an account, in right-stepping verse stanzas, of the first human 
settlement in a Staffordshire landscape, a ‘navel’ appearing ‘out of the trees’ (CP 25). This is 
indebted to several passages in Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane (1959) where Eliade 
remarks upon the tendency of human settlements—following a near-universal religious notion 
that the universe was produced from a single centre—to develop outwards from a central node.42 
The poem then cuts, almost cinematically, to the present, and to direct observation in clear 
empirical couplets: 
  
 the east edge of the parish now 
 is a stream in a sandy ditch; 
 
                                                            
40 See Stokes, The Quattro Cento, pp. 59-65. 
41 Langley and Walker, ‘R. F. Langley Interviewed by R. F. Walker’, p. 239. 
42 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. by Willard R. Trask (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 45-7. 
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 a shelterbelt banks it: 
 alder, willow, some bigger trees, 
 
 and the scene here is, 
 at the hedge corner, 
 
 a fine, detailed bush, dead, 
 a wicker cage now 
 
 where three or more warblers 
hawk at the flies.   (CP 26) 
 
An accumulative, spondaic rhythm gives the impression that the ‘scene’ is not recollected in 
tranquillity but registered in real-time, maybe en plein air. With the exception of the ‘wicker cage’ 
(and a pun about warblers that ‘hawk’), the couplets are not figurative, observing the landscape 
without defamiliarising it. The indefinite article constructions (‘a stream’, ‘a sandy ditch’, ‘a 
shelterbelt’, ‘a fine, detailed brush’, ‘a wicker cage’) suggest an eye roving over the terrain. The 
transparency of the observations offers a counterpoint to the preceding, Eliade-derived lines, in 
which the landscape had been viewed, at one remove, through the medium of descriptive 
knowledge in anthropology and comparative religion. The shift into couplets registers not only a 
change of subject and temporality then, but, more substantively, a transition from one species of 
knowledge to another. 
But these couplets are juxtaposed even more sharply with passages of outright exposition. 
The technique is that of Pound’s Cantos but sounds more like Olson, particularly the first volume 
of The Maximus Poems. On the left is Langley’s account of the Staffordshire enclosures, on the 
right Olson’s version of an early voyage to the New World, led, Olson believes, by John Watts.43 
 
Enclosures in this parish cut up          When he was Gloucester 
the Open Fields round its centre      it was after the Rush, after fish 
before 1758 and took the Commons       had lost their market. England  
30 yrs later, fast, from the    
declaration on the church door      plunged into two wars   
                                                            
43 See George F. Butterick, A Guide to the Maximus Poems of Charles Olson (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980), p. 172. 
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to the Commissioners’ meeting,        the same years the first Gloucester  
with maps and rules, at the ‘Anchor’,       held the stage, in Commons & in mer-  
15 days, one objector, one resident       chants’ minds: 1624 
undecided. From here we have,    
minor changes only, the present fields,       war with Spain, 1626   
squarish, five to ten acres, hedges        war with France, & prices  
with quickthorn inset with elm,        knocked off the chance  
spaced, bright willow by the waters.       a fishing station here 
             
                                                                                    would pay.44   
 
       (CP 27-8)    
 
Tellingly, while Olson’s passage is almost provocatively flat (‘1624 || war with Spain, 1626 | war 
with France’), Langley’s retains a vestige of sensuous detail (‘quickthorn inset with elm’, ‘bright 
willow by the waters’). Even so, these appear in a passage whose voice is otherwise dry and 
professorial: ‘From here we have’ might be sounded from the lectern. The overall tone is not 
quite oral, however, since the abbreviation ‘30 yrs’ breaks the lyric illusion that we are 
overhearing a speaking voice, and frames the poem instead as a material text, perhaps in the 
form of hastily penned reading notes or marginalia. That this too is a fiction becomes apparent 
as soon as the lyric images detach themselves from the hard dates and facts, a transition that 
plays out over the course of a single sentence: ‘five to ten acres, hedges | with quickthorn inset 
with elm, | spaced, bright willow by the waters’.45 If the passage itself displays a kind of generic 
codeswitching or macaronic, this is true of the poem as a whole, which transitions between 
longer prosaic lines and compressed imagistic detail, propositional knowledge and the 
transparent physical eye. The sensuous and the cerebral are drawn apart, in other words, by 
formal device.  
                                                            
44 Charles Olson, The Maximus Poems, ed. by George F. Butterick (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), p. 119. 
45 ‘Willow by the waters’ (scanning xu-uu-xu) is audibly Poundian, sounding like Pound’s 
numerous ‘amid’ constructions. Compare, for instance, ‘Owl-eye amid pine boughs’, Canto 21, 
The Cantos (New York: New Directions, 1996), p. 99. 
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Recouping and extending the examples provided by Pound, Olson and Williams, such 
juxtapositions appeared frequently in long-form topographic poetry of the 1970s. Iain Sinclair’s 
Lud Heat (1975), for instance, shifted between poetry and prose in the course of drawing its 
cityscape around the six London churches of Nicholas Hawksmoor.46 The technique is also 
found in work outside the British Poetry Revival, such as John Montague’s The Rough Field 
(1972).47 Yet the distinction between genres in ‘Matthew Glover’ is not as definitive as that in, 
for instance, Sinclair’s book, so that the nominally discrete forms of thinking embodied by these 
forms begin to lose their autonomy. In the following lines, for instance, a two-line minimalist 
lyric evolves with only slight interruption into the recovered historical voice of Matthew Glover, 
who would not ‘speak for or against’ enclosure: 
 
     the small crack 
     willow is dull 
 
     until the low 
     wind creams it 
 
     up with a purr 
     like bunches of 
 
     paper it blows 
     it purrs it purrs 
 
 
   Owning very little land 
   rated at eightpence 
   very little soil 
   
   maybe I did wish 
   to oppose the Bill 
                                                            
46 For an account of Olson’s influence in Britain see Gavin Selerie, ‘From Weymouth back: 
Olson’s British contacts, travels, and legacy’, in Contemporary Olson, ed. by David Herd 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), pp. 113–26.  
47 In Montague’s case, the precedent was more varied, combining the American ‘open’ poem 
with the example of Hugh MacDiarmid’s A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle (1926). In a 1989 
preface to the poem, Montague noted: ‘Although living in Berkeley introduced me to the debate 
on open-form from Paterson, through Olson, to Duncan, I was equally drawn by rooted poets 
like MacDiarmid in A Drunk Man…’. John Montague, The Rough Field, 5th edn (Newcastle upon 




   but I dared not do it 
   for fear I had missed …   (CP 29-30) 
 
While indentation enforces something of a distinction here between visual observation and 
historical knowledge, the tendency of the two half-rhyming couplets is to collapse history into 
the lyric mode. Far from an abrupt transition from perception to exposition, the return to 
couplets appears to insist on the consistency between history and visual perceptivity. If ‘The 
Upshot’ found no solution to the hindrance of excessive ‘knowing’, ‘Matthew Glover’ is similarly 
sceptical about detaching immediate acquaintance from descriptive fact. While the long passage 
beginning ‘Enclosures in this parish cut up’ (CP 27) marks itself off as expository near-prose, the 
later movements of the poem meld historical interpretation with more direct seeing. 
  
THE JOURNALS 
Langley’s impromptu bibliography of frequently read books reveals a coherent—if 
unorthodox—account of modern literature and philosophy. A dominant theme is the irony 
which attends any cerebral effort to jettison the intellect, or the paradox of reason holding itself 
to account. The British psychoanalytic literature (Milner, D. W. Winnicott, Melanie Klein, 
Wilfred Bion) represents one version of the classic modern effort to challenge the primacy of 
reason, while Milner’s experiments in ‘blind thinking’ finds an art critical cognate in Stokes’s 
aesthetic instancy. In Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception the embodied subject 
usurps the privileged position traditionally granted to a detached consciousness, while in John 
Cage’s Silence abstract reason is critiqued with faux-naïf astringency. Similarly, Bresson’s Notes on 
Cinematography insist that the cinematographer should ‘stick exclusively to impressions, to 
sensations’ and allow ‘no intervention of intelligence’ or, as he subsequently puts it, ‘[n]o 
intellectual or cerebral mechanism. Simply a mechanism’.48 American modernist poetics from 
                                                            
48 Bresson, Notes on Cinematography, pp. 17-18. 
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Pound through to Olson and Oppen also stake out positions antithetical to abstract or 
instrumental reasoning, whether through the ideogram, ‘proprioception’ or phenomenology.49  
Yet as ‘The Upshot’ and ‘Matthew Glover’ suggest, Langley’s work registers the 
attraction of indirect, propositional knowledge at the same time that it recognises the barriers 
such knowledge might present to aesthetic or sensuous immediacy. This ambivalence also 
persists as a structural tension throughout Langley’s Journals, which he began to compose in 
1969.50 Instalments of the journal were first published in PN Review in 2002 and at the time of 
writing (late 2016) are continuing to appear in that venue.51 In 2006 Shearsman published a 
selection of entries from 1970 to 2005.52 Though Jeremy Noel-Tod’s editorial notes to the 
Complete Poems confirmed a close working relationship between the journals and the poems, it 
would be a mistake to regard the journals as a mere repository of impressions waiting to be 
worked up (or over) into poetry. The journals are works in their own right and often approach 
problems of perception and knowledge with the same rigour as the poems. Indeed, these entries 
are amenable to a similar kind of textual analysis, since Langley’s epistemological concerns are 
worked out here at the level of prose device. In the following passage, excerpted from an entry 
of August 1982, the subject is not Harlech beach in Gwynedd, Wales, so much as its 
representation to the senses and through the faculty of Langley’s acquired—linguistic—
intelligence: 
 
Pure postcard on Tuesday. Puffs of cloud overland, and thin cirrus over 
the sea. Hot enough in the wind to redden us all on Harlech beach. 
Into the dunes there, barefoot and careful for glass and harsh marram. 
A sudden glaucous blue patch, like litter, but it is cool sea-holly, tough 
and heavy. Rest harrow everywhere. Carline thistles, intricate, with 
glossy white-gold rays. Hollows floored with creeping willow, with 
catkins, and knotted pearlwort. The mashed urchin cases, chalky, 
                                                            
49 Charles Olson, ‘Proprioception’, in Collected Prose, ed. by Donald Allen and Benjamin 
Friedlander (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 179-99. 
50 See Noel-Tod, ‘Introduction’, p. x. 
51 See R. F. Langley, ‘From the Journals of R. F. Langley’, PN Review 43.1 (September/October 
2016), 21 (p. 21). 
52 R. F. Langley, Journals (Exeter: Shearsman Books, 2006). 
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broken, papery, in middens at the waterline. The leathery horseshoe 
prints, which are the eggs of the necklace shell, sunk in gleaming sand. 
A damp apple core, shoved into dry sand, with suggestions of sand in 
the teeth, grit in saliva, cut tongues, spit not thick enough. A crow 
opens and lifts off with a tilt from the wrack. Crab bits. Pin eyes. White 
legs. Closed claws. Flies swirl up and land on wrists, with offensive feet. 
Is there a smell of fish? Yet, also, there is a sudden sweetness in the air, 
or detected on the fingers. As you come out, the sea warms the backs 
of your calves. Soft, ropey weed wraps your knees.53 
 
Langley balked at the idea that he was ‘any sort of surrealist’, insisting that he was concerned 
with the ‘observation of fact’.54 Yet the two positions occupy extreme ends of the same 
spectrum, at least in a passage such as this. The rapid shifts of scale, for instance, closely recall 
the disorientating quality of early twentieth-century cinematic montage (‘A crow opens and lifts 
off with a tilt from the wrack. Crab bits. Pin eyes’).55 Such parataxes, cutting from wide angle to 
extreme close-up, may present the ‘facts’, but they also try the reader’s ability to supply a context, 
or imagine a world, in which those two orders of magnitude (the sky and the eyes of a crab) 
might eventually coincide. In the later journal entries, this rapid alternation between deep and 
shallow focus becomes both a perceptual exercise and a self-conscious literary technique: 
‘Clarity. Nitidus. Tidy. The bird over there and the spiders here’.56 
But the ‘observation of fact’ presents even further difficulties. For Langley, according to 
Prynne, to know ‘the difference between a martin and a swift’ was to know ‘everything’.57 At the 
same time, there is every difference between the ‘smell of a fish’ and the experience of ‘sea-holly’, 
‘marram’ and ‘pearlwort’; none of which would stand out distinctively without acquired botanical 
knowledge. Musical nouns (‘carline’, ‘marram’) register the intervention of knowledge by 
                                                            
53 Langley, Journals, p. 29. 
54 Quoted in Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry’, p. 16. 
55 N. H. Reeve and Richard Kerridge regard shifts of scale as distinctive of Prynne’s work. See 
Reeve and Kerridge, Nearly Too Much: The Poetry of J. H. Prynne (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1996), chapter 1. 
56 Langley, Journals, p. 105. 
57 Quoted in Noel-Tod, ‘Introduction’, p. xiii. 
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description, with direct physical acquaintance (the ‘smell of a fish’) quickly superseded by the 
botanical catalogue. 
 However, the authority of the resonant proper noun does not go unchecked. Even in 
this passage, the terminological exactitude of the beach flora is pitched against vaguer and more 
ordinary—even conventional—constructions: ‘crab bits’, ‘puffs of cloud’, ‘ropey weed’, ‘white 
legs’. There is, in other words, a transition between sense-data and acquired knowledge; a 
movement reflected in both lexical choice and syntax (‘crab bits’ and ‘pin eyes’ do not make full 
sentences). Occasionally, this produces strange effects. For instance, there are ‘puffs of cloud 
over land’ but ‘cirrus over the sea’; the first suggesting a quick registering of the skyline (and 
therefore a cliché), the second a more considered, informed characterisation. Then again, maybe 
‘puffs’ was chosen to alliterate with ‘pure postcard’, another deliberate cliché? In either case, a 
fluid diction and syntax represents a variable meeting with the scene; at one moment 
unreflective, at another moment approached through the medium of prior understanding. The 
temptation to equate things with their description survives alongside a recognition that ‘intense 
ignorance’ (however inaccessible) might be the more dependable ground of knowledge.58 
 
‘NICK-NACK OF NAMES’ 
Pound had already offered one possible solution to the contradiction between indirect 
knowledge and perceptual instancy. Insisting that ‘we should read less, far less than we do’, the 
poet proposed a more efficient approach to the organisation of learning.59 Looking to history, we 
need not know that ‘so-and-so was, in such-and-such a year, elected Doge. So-and-so killed the 
tyrant. So-and-so was banished for embezzling State funds’.60 Such facts ‘tell us nothing we did 
                                                            
58 Bresson, Notes on Cinematography, p. 8. 
59  Ezra Pound, ‘I gather the Limbs of Osiris’, in Selected Prose 1909-1965, ed. by William  
Cookson (New York: New Directions, 1973), p. 23. 
60 Ibid., p. 22. 
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not know, nothing which enlightens us’.61 Instead, Pound says, we should recover the small 
‘interpreting detail’ which breaks open the full significance of its historical moment.62 Put simply, 
the poet should render history in a series of images; details which reveal—instantly, like Stokes’s 
‘Quattro Cento’ style—the entire timbre of their moment. 
In the later cantos, particularly the ‘Adams’ and ‘China’ cantos, this method is stretched 
almost to breaking point. Pound is more comfortable with ‘so-and-so’ and ‘such-and-such’ in 
Rapallo than he was in London. Langley’s later oeuvre might also suggest a less ambivalent 
embrace of erudition. While the later poems still play variations on Langley’s familiar vocabulary 
of themes and ideas, they take a different stance toward the function of knowledge by 
description, particularly that of nomenclature. In the late ‘To a Nightingale’, for instance, the 
proper nouns of natural history accumulate in even seven-syllable lines as if to hold off the 
approach of ‘nothing’; a world prior to verbal distinctions: 
 
Nothing along the road. But 
petals, maybe. Pink behind 
and white inside. Nothing but 
the coping of a bridge. Mutes 
on the bricks, hard as putty, 
then, in the sun, as metal. 
Burls of Grimmia, hairy, 
hoary, with their seed-capsules 
uncurling. Red mites bowling 
about on the baked lichen 
and what look like casual 
landings, striped flies, Helina, 
Phaonia, could they be? 
This month the lemon, I’ll say 
primrose-coloured, moths, which flinch 
along the hedge then turn in 
to hide, are Yellow Shells not 
Shaded Broad-bars. Lines waver. 
Camptogramma. Heat off the 
road and the nick-nack of names. 
Scotopteryx. Darkwing. The 
flutter. Doubles and blurs the 





margin. Fuscous and white. Stop 
at nothing. To stop here at 
nothing, as a chaffinch sings 
interminably, all day.     (CP 153) 
 
As in ‘The Upshot’ (and perhaps with buried allusions to Shakespeare) the first half of the poem 
pivots around ‘nothing’s’ several senses. On the one hand, ‘nothing along the road’ might alert us 
to the fact of—in Viktor Shklovsky’s words—‘automatized perception’.63 That is, ‘nothing’ is 
simply a conventionalised indifference to what is already at hand. However, ‘nothing’ also carries 
overtones from existential philosophy (particularly if we know that Langley was a reader of 
Sartre).64 In this case, the eruption of proper nouns might be a verbal defence against a void 
(‘nothing’) which nomenclature only barely keeps at bay (the pronounced caesurae heighten the 
effect of accumulation). The more closely the speaker looks at ‘nothing’ the more promptly it 
calls upon the speaker’s command of natural history and its language: Grimmia, Helina, Phaonia, 
Scotopteryx, Camptogramma.  
Even as the nouns pile up, however, scepticism gathers around the true extent of their 
value. If ‘Heat off the |road and the nick-nack of names’ is meant as an equivalence, for 
instance, the implication seems to be that the names reeled off by the speaker distort the objects 
before him, just as the ripples in a heat haze distort the road.65 In this case, ‘Stop | at nothing. 
To stop here at | nothing’ does not describe the ‘flinch’ of the moths in the air or the flight of 
the chaffinch, but rather offers a warning to the speaker to avoid the Adamic inclination to fix 
things by their names. ‘Nothing’, in this reading, is not Shklovsky’s automatic indifference or the 
                                                            
63 Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, trans. by Benjamin Sher (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 
1998), p. 12. 
64 Sartre appears in Jeremy Noel-Tod’s notes to ‘Mariana’, ‘The Upshot’ and ‘The Ecstasy 
Inventories’. 
65 Lacy Rumsey notes that ‘nick-nack’ may also refer to a ‘petty trick or subterfuge’. Rumsey, ‘On 
R. F. Langley’s “To a Nightingale”’, Études britanniques contemporaines <https://ebc.revues.org/ 
3478> [accessed 5 June 2017]. Rumsey positions ‘To a Nightingale’ between the English 
Romantic and American modernist traditions. 
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‘nothing’ which, for Sartre, the subject is ‘to begin with’.66 Rather, it is the receptive ‘emptiness’ 
of ‘The Upshot’ or Bresson’s passionate ignorance. The second half of the poem attests to this, 
moving incrementally to the position reached three decades earlier in ‘The Upshot’: 
 
A chiff-chaff. Purring of two 
turtle doves. Voices, and some 
vibrate with tenderness. I 
say none of this for love. It 
is anyone’s giff-gaff. It 
is anyone’s quelque chose. 
No business of mine. Mites which 
ramble. Caterpillars which 
curl up as question marks. Then 
one note, five times, louder each 
time, followed, after a fraught 
pause, by a soft cuckle of 
wet pebbles, which I could call 
a glottal rattle. I am 
empty, stopped at nothing, as 
I wait for this song to shoot. 
The road is rising as it 
passes the apple tree and 
makes its approach to the bridge.   (CP 153-4) 
 
The speaker ‘could’ refer to their ‘soft cuckle’ by way of linguistics and phonology (a ‘glottal 
rattle’), but would that make the ‘wet pebbles’ any more immediate? Though the question is 
apophatic (the metaphor appears even as it is called into question), it opens out into a moment 
of blind attention: ‘I am | empty, stopped at nothing, as | I wait for this song to shoot’. 
Although the lines recall Emerson’s passage on the transparent eyeball (‘I am nothing’), Langley’s 
is a reverse Transcendentalism. Being ‘empty’ or ‘stopped at nothing’ does not spirit the speaker 
into ‘currents of the Universal Being’ but rather plants him more firmly on the ground.67 The 
                                                            
66 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. by Philip Mairet (York: Methuen, 2013), p. 
30. 
67 Emerson, Essays and Lectures, p. 10. 
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‘radically pared’ language, as Jeremy Noel-Tod describes it, underscores this retreat.68 Yet the 
speaker only reaches firm ground through the via negativa represented by the ‘nick nack of names’ 
and their tendentious promise of immediacy. In ‘To a Nightingale’, at least, the physical eye and 
the erring brain meet with one another, as if ‘emptiness’ could only be approached, negatively, 
through a veil of language. 
 
Though it invites reading within the context of the ode form in general and Keats in particular, 
‘To a Nightingale’ also attends to the characteristic problems of Langley’s work. Oblique to the 
British late modernism of the Cambridge School and language-centred tendencies in the United 
States, Langley’s small body of poetry works with quiet persistence through the intransigence of 
experience and towards a language adequate to its uncertainties.  
The New American Poetry, and perhaps especially the work of Charles Olson, was a 
crucial impetus for the early work, as it was for the poetry of Prynne, Tom Raworth, Peter Riley 
and others among Langley’s contemporaries. Moreover, Langley shared with Prynne and other 
British late modernists an early critical interest in the problems of perception and the new 
literature of phenomenology, the key works of which began to appear in English in the early 
1960s.69 However, Langley’s keen ‘observation of fact’ charted an independent course, 
combining radical empiricism with self-conscious scrutiny of the apparatus of perception.70 
While Prynne, for instance, often exposes the linguistic and epistemic structures through which 
knowledge is controlled and instrumentalized, Langley maintains attention to the problem of 
perception and knowledge at the level of the experiencing subject. Indeed, in Langley’s writing 
the ambivalent modulation between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is 
                                                            
68 Jeremy Noel-Tod, ‘“In different voices”: Modernism since the 1960s’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Contemporary British and Irish Poetry, ed. by Peter Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 114. 
69 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945) appeared in an English translation by  
Colin Smith in 1962. 
70 Quoted in Bradford, ‘The Long Question of Poetry’, p. 16. 
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both revealed and dramatized, with the ‘clear physical eye’ of American modernist poetics 
competing with the ulterior claims of natural history, social history and the history of art.71 
This ‘alertness to perception’, in Prynne’s words, does not quite exhaust Langley’s 
practice.72 Major poems such as ‘Juan Fernandez’, for instance, are less directly empirical and 
more recalcitrantly allusive.73 Moreover, Langley’s practice was far from fixed, eventually availing 
itself of ‘all available strategies’, as the poet put it in 1994.74 In the late work this means not only 
new experiments with rhyme but also a more willing accommodation of ‘autobiographical 
experiences’.75  Indeed, in late poems such as ‘To a Nightingale’ Langley’s investigation of 
perception almost requires what Olson had condemned as the ‘lyrical interference of the 
individual as ego’.76 
Even so, ‘opening up to what is there’ (as the poet himself described the practice of 
William Carlos Williams) foregrounds Langley’s extended negotiation with both modernist 
poetics and a wider modern literary and philosophical analysis of perception.77 Quoting the Pre-
Raphaelite painter Ford Madox Brown, Langley would describe such work as verbal, ongoing, 
and ultimately unfinishable. Its subject: “Not things, but seeing things.”’.78 
 
                                                            
71 Zukofsky, Prepositions, p. 159. 
72 Quoted in Noel-Tod, ‘Introduction’, p. xiii. 
73 Langley described ‘Juan Fernandez’ as ‘a denser sort of thing altogether’. Langley and Walker,  
‘R. F. Langley Interviewed by R. F. Walker’, p. 251. 
74 R. F. Langley, ‘Note’ (1994), in Complete Poems, ed. by Jeremy Noel-Tod (Manchester: Carcanet, 
2015), p. xvii. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Olson, ‘Projective Verse’, p. 247. 
77 Langley and Walker, ‘R. F. Langley Interviewed by R. F. Walker’, p. 248. 
78 Langley, ‘Note’, p. xvii. 
